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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
AN OUTLINE OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
By DUANE R. NEDRUD*
AREST AND DETENTIoN A§R
A§1.1 Reasonable Grounds
"Reasonable grounds," "probable cause" and "reasonable
cause" are u s e d interchangeably. The t e r m "reasonable
grounds" is generally associated with arrest without a war-
rant because of the common law rule and its statutory progeny.
"Probable cause" is identified with the issuance of warrants
because of its fourth amendment origin. "Reasonable cause,"
on the other hand, seems to be a hybrid of the two, although
it is usually considered statutory. Insofar as warrantless
felony arrests by peace officers are concerned, the rule io
virtually unchanged from its early common law beginnings.
Simply stated, this rule is: an arrest may be made without
a warrant by a peace officer who has reasonable grounds to
believe that a felony has been committed and that the person
to be arrested is the culprit.
There are a number of "reasonable grounds / probable
cause" definitions. Since the "fundamental criteria" must come
from the decisions of the Supreme Court,' one very popular
Court definition is: "Probable cause exists where 'the facts
and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable cau-
*Editor of the monthly loose-leaf Service NEDRUD THE
CRIMINAL LAW, which is co-edited by Marguerite D.
Oberto. The article and sectional divisions are the copyright
of L. E. Publishers, Incorporated, 612 North Michigan Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois. The sections in this article are those used
to correlate case summaries under Tab Division A., Arrest,
Search and Seizure in the loose-leaf service.
" Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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ARRESTS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
tion in the belief that' an offense has been or is being com-
mitted."2
The rules for arrest are directed to the peace officer who,
in his official capacity, has more authority to arrest than does
a citizen. While the term "reasonable" with its connotation
of flexibility appears frequently throughout the law as a
whole, it should be remembered that the probable cause def-
inition of a "man of reasonable caution" describes one who
possesses a certain amount of expertise. Thus, the police
officer with that expertise may be able to establish reasonable
grounds where one who lacks the knowledge of the expert
would not be able to do so.3 The difficulty is not so much with
the definition as with its application to the facts, particularly
in the officer's communication to the court at the motion to
suppress, so that the trial court can discern that the officer,
knowing what he knows, seeing what he saw and/or hearing
what he heard, had reasonable grounds.
A§1.2 Warrant Requirements
The Constitution lays down the requirements for issuance
of warrants. In the arrest warrant the element of "partic-
ularly describing.., the person.., to be seized" 4 is satisfied
by naming the person. Only in the rare instance where a
"John Doe" warrant issued must there be a complete descrip-
tion to guide the arresting officer and to prevent a conflict
with the fourth amendment.
But, as in the case of the search warrant, most of the
2 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), as
adapted from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
For leading Supreme Court decisions relating to arrest with-
out a warrant, see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
3 E.g., the officer on the narcotics squad would recognize the
smell of marijuana or opium; he could identify narcotics
paraphernalia or the packaging peculiar to narcotics.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19681
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controversy centers in the detailing of probable cause in the
complaint or affidavit. Because an arrest warrant under
the present rules seems superfluous,5 the full impact of the
importance of establishing probable cause in the complaint
has not come about. It is clear that, for the arrest warrant
to have been legally issued, the affiant must have given the
same full disclosure necessary to show probable cause for
making an arrest as has always been necessary in obtaining a
search warrant.6
A§l.3 Misdemeanors
In the case of misdemeanor arrests there are two rules,
both of which have a common law background. One might
be denominated the strict rule: a peace officer may arrest
for a breach of the peace committed in his presence, all other
misdemeanor arrests must be upon a warrant.7 The other
rule is that a peace officer may arrest for any misdemeanor
committed in his presence and for a breach of the peace upon
the same grounds as for a felony.8 Many states have revised
5 See notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text. However,
some caution should be expressed. As noted in Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964): "An arrest without a warrant
bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective prede-
termination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the
far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justifica-
tion for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influ-
enced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment."6 Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). %
7 A few states, for example Massachusetts (with exceptions),
have followed this strict rule; but changes have occurred
rapidly since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Restric-
tions were quite prevalent pre-Mapp, and there was no
motivation for change since the exclusionary rule did not
apply to the states.
8 This is the more typical rule. But even a rule of this type
has some problems with "presence." In affording a liberal
construction to the rule, it was determined that neither
physical proximity nor sight is essential. In re McDonald,
249, A.C.A. 1079, 431 P.2d 507, 58 Cal. Pptr. 29 (1967).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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or are revising their rules to give the peace officer the same
authority to arrest for a misdemeanor as is provided in the
general rule for a felony arrest
The importance of adopting the felony rule for misde-
meanors is obvious: many misdemeanor arrests, especially of
the traffic violation variety, result in the discovery of more
serious crimes. If the arrest for the misdemeanor is illegal,
the evidence of the more serious crime seized incident to the
misdemeanor arrest must be suppressed.
A§1.4 Detention--"Stop and Frisk"
An officer can request a person to stop and ask that
person questions.' 0 The issue in controversy is whether the
officer has the authority forcibly to detain the person if he
refuses to stop. Ordinarily an officer has authority to stop
an automobile to check whether it is properly registered and
whether its driver has a license. But if there exist only sus-
picious circumstances which are insufficient to establish prob-
able cause for arrest, what can the officer do?"t
9 This is one of the areas which the Supreme Court left open
in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). There is nothing
unreasonable in providing that an arrest may be made for
a misdemeanor upon the same grounds as for a felony. The
common law distinction between a misdemeanor and a fel-
ony is no longer valid since the misdemeanor in today's crim-
inal law may be a far more serious crime. For example,
such a change has been effected by the judiciary in State
v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 202 A.2d 678 (1964); but in New
Jersey a misdemeanor is punishable by three years im-
prisonment. However, a distinction seems to be made as
to "minor" misdemeanors.. State v. Orr, 93 N.J. Super. 140,
225 A.2d 157 (App. Div. 1966). Missouri police officers, in
the metropolitan areas of St. Louis and Kansas City, have
this authority by statute. Mo. REv. STAT. §§84.090, -. 710
(Vernons, 1967 Supp.).
10 But the person need not stop. Gallegos v. People, 157 Colo.
App. 173, 401 P.2d 613 (1965); Moore v. State, 181 So. 2d
164 (Fla. App. 1965).
" See Coston v. State, 252 Miss. 257, 172 So. 2d 764 (1965);
Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W. 2d 475 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965).
1968]
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 5 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss2/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5, No. 2
In several states law enforcement has been given the so-
called "stop and frisk" authority, whereby an officer can
detain a person for a reasonable length of time on "reasonable
suspicion."'1 2 Along with the authority to detain is the au-
thority to search the person detained to determine whether
he has a weapon which might be used against the officer. In
other words, the officer has the right to search in order to
protect himself.13
SEARCH Am SxUP= A§2
A§2.1 Probable Cause: Warrant
The search warrant prerequisite is an affidavit which
outlines probable cause. In contrast to the arrest warrant,
there is no question of the search warrant's necessity,14 assum-
ing that there were no grounds for making an arrest. Thus,
for guidance in deciding what is and what is not probable
cause and how it must be enumerated in the affidavit, the
12 New York does so by statute. N.Y. CODE Cm. PRoc. §180-a,
(McKinney, 1967 p.p.) upheld in People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.
2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966). California
has provided such a rule by judicial decision. People v.
Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18
(1963). Recently New Jersey, in spite of the cases pending
before the Supreme Court, has adopted a judicial "stop-and-
frisk" rule. State v. Dilley, 49 N.J. 460, 231 A.2d 353 (1967).
13 In relation to a suspect's detention for investigation pro-
vided by the so-called "stop and frisk" laws and/or judicial
decisions, it is reasonable to predict that the Supreme Court,
in the cases now before it, will uphold the "frisking" of
suspects for weapons and allow the admission into evi-
dence of any weapon found; but that it will not allow the
use of other evidence obtained in the "patting down," such
as narcotics or burglary tools. The concern may well be
that a police officer would use the authority as a subter-
fuge for obtaining "other" evidence which is not in accord
with the purpose of the rule of self-protection of the officer.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1967, at 34, col. 2 (city ed.).
14 For a few exceptions, see A§2.2 (automobiles) and A§2.5
(persons and places without a warrant) infra.
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factual situations, which vary from case to case, must be
examined. 15
In contrast to arrest without a warrant (and the search
incident thereto) or in the other limited areas where searches
may be made without a warrant (for example, automobiles),
probable cause must be related to a magistrate before the
search is made. The definition of probable cause is similar to
that for reasonable grounds for arrest without a warrant. How-
ever, probable cause points to the evidence to be seized and the
place where it is located; that is, probable cause to believe that
named evidence is in a named place. The officer may have suf-
ficient grounds to obtain a warrant; but if they are not dis-
closed to the magistrate, the search warrant may be illegal.16
Considering the fact variable in each case, the general rule is
that facts and not conclusions must be presented. An officer
who can rely upon his own senses to establish probable cause
for a warrant has few drafting problems. Ordinarily, however,
grounds for arrest depend upon information received from
others. With the introduction of a source other than the
affiant-officer, of necessity more care must be exercised in
detailing probable cause. When, as is the usual situation, the
information source is an informant, the officer must establish
two things: (1) the reliability of the informant and (2) that
the informant knows from his own knowledge (and not from
some secondary source) that the evidence to be seized is lo-
cated in the named place.17
A§2.2 Other Warrant Requirements
Having concluded that probable cause must be clearly
expressed, the question then is whether it must be in writing
15 Since there are no changes here as seem to be prevalent
in the other areas, the two cases which tell the complete
warrant story are Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). For
a thorough discussion, see D. NEDRuD, Issuance of Warrants:
Aguilar and Giordenello in TnE Csn\'=AL LAW A-13 (1967).
16 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
17 D. NEDRUD, supra note 15.
19683
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or may it be oral. The fourth amendment specifies only that
the warrant be supported by oath or affirmation; technically
it does not require that the warrant be in writing.18 The
amendment has been assumed, if not interpreted, to prescribe
a hearing before a "neutral magistrate" and to suggest the
need for supervision not only of the police but also of the
lower courts by the appellate courts. Some type of record
seems to be indicated, if not required. It may be that probable
cause need not be spelled out in the affidavit; but, at the
hearing before the magistrate prior to issuance of the warrant,
it would seem that recording by tape, stenographic notes or
handwritten notes by the magistrate should be utilized.
In addition to the oath and the appearance before a
magistrate, the fourth amendment requires a particular de-
scription of the place to be searched and the evidence to be
seized. Description of the place to be searched is satisfied
by the street address or the name of the occupants.'0
The description of what is to be seized is more of a prob-
lem. 20 It is clear that "mere evidence" may be seized by
warrant or as incident to an arrest.21 If the object is subject
to description-for example, a Buick automobile with the
year, serial number, etc., or a .22 caliber pistol with a pearl
18 There is some dispute whether all the information must be
reduced to writing for the magistrate or whether it can
also be given orally. See Miller v. Sigler, 353 F.2d 424 (8th
Cir. 1965); Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143, 147 S.E.2d
666 (1966) ; State v. Titus, 107 N.H. 215, 220 A.2d 154 (1966) ;
Commonwealth v. Crawley, 209 Pa. Super. 70, 223 A. 2d
885 (1966) (courts holding that additional information be-
yond the affidavit may be presented orally to the mag-
istrate).
19 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
20 E.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property at 104 East
Tenth Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
21 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), allows the seizure
of evidence if statutes so provide. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524 as
amended, (West 1967 Supp.), allows the seizure of "evi-
dence."
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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handle-then of course the constitutional requirements are
easily met. But if bulk material, the form of which can be
changed, is the object of the seizure, a general description,
such as heroin or marijuana, may be sufficient.22 Again
"particularity" as with "reasonableness" depends upon the facts
and circumstances.
Limitations may be placed upon the time a warrant may
be executed by specifying in the daytime or the nighttime.
A§2.3 Incident to Arrest-Arrest or Search for One Offense,
Seizure for Another
This topic is the end product of an arrest on reasonable
grounds,24 although it may be a factor where a search warrant
is issued and evidence of other crimes is discovered in the
search.25
Assuming that the arrest is based upon reasonable grounds,
a determination whether the search is legal entails examination
both of the extent of the search and the area the search may
cover and still be incident to the arrest 26 and the intensity of
the search and seizure.27 The seizure of mere evidence is now
authorized.28 The facts and circumstances of each case govern
because, again, the issue is "reasonableness."
When the matter seized is not that for which the arrest
22 E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967)
("book-making paraphernalia" was found adequate).
2 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
24 See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. The exclusionary
rule only comes into play if evidence is seized incident to
an illegal arrest. An illegal arrest as such does not neces-
sarily affect the conviction. E. g., Howard v. Allgood, 272
F. Supp. 381 (E.D. La. 1967).
2t E g., Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.
1966).
26 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
27 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
28 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
290 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
19681
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was made, still another issue is raised.29 It must be determined
whether the original arrest or search is a pretext to search
for another crime. This is a factual matter. In resolving it,
much emphasis must be placed on the question of whether the
arresting officer would have, in good faith, made the arrest or
search without the ulterior motive of hoping to find evidence
of another offense.3 0
A§2.4 Automobiles
The search of automobiles is dominated by the Carrol-
Preston-Cooper doctrine. First, the Carrol31 element permits
the search of an automobile without a warrant because of its
mobility. But this by no means eliminates the requirement
of probable cause. Second, the PrestonP2 element is some-
what of a limitation on Carroll since it requires that search
be accomplished while the automobile is still mobile. If the
automobile has become immobilized, as by having been im-
pounded, a warrant is essential. The Cooper3 3 element modifies
Preston and permits the search of an impounded automobile
which by statute has been forfeited because of its use in a
crime. Cooper may extend beyond its stated limitation, how-
ever. It may allow characterization of the automobile as an
instrumentality of crime. Thus where the automobile was
used in the commission of rape or robbery and has been
impounded on grounds similar to those permitting confisca-
tion of a weapon, the automobile may be subject to examina-
tion as a gun is subject to a ballistics test.3 4
A matter related to an actual automobile search is the
30 While Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), is
deemed more of a doctrine related to the search of auto-
mobiles, it now appears that Mr. Justice Black was pri-
marily concerned that the initial arrest was for vagrancy.
See his opinion for the majority in Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967).
31 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
32 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
33 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
34 Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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observing of evidence through the automobile window. This
does not amount to a search, and a warrant should not be
required for a valid seizuresr Also to be considered is the
caretaking operation 6 as a necessary permissible function.
A§2.5 Persons and Places-Without a Warrant
No search warrant is required to permit legal seizure of
evidence in places or things open to view without the need
of a search. The search of a prisoner or one about to be
imprisoned does not require a warrant.V 7 Also excepted from
the requirement of a warrant are "border" searches which
may extend not only to a person but also to an automobile.88
While commonly associated with cause for entry, "exigent cir-
cumstances," such as the saving of a life, can eliminate the need
of a search warrant. Nor is a warrant required if the prop-
erty to be seized39 or the place to be searched" is govern-
mental.
A§2.6 Consent-Abandonment
Consent to search may be given by a suspect or pros-
pective defendant or by third persons. The consent of the
defendant must be voluntary and uncoerced. Although there
is presently no requirement that Miranda v. Arizona41 warn-
ings be given, that they have not been given could become
a factor where consent is challenged.42 As in the weighing
36 E.g., United States v. Callahan, 256 F. Supp. 739 (Minn.
1966); State v. Hill, 422 P.2d 675 (Ore. 1967).
36 Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477 (D. C. Cir. 1966); Peo-
ple v. Gil, 248 Cal. App.2d 189, - P.2d -, 56 Cal.Rptr.
88 (1967); St. Clair v. State, I Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565
(1967).
7 Arabia v. State, 421 P.2d 952 (Nev. 1966).
38 E.g., Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
$1 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
40 United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
41 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42 An exception is the new Oregon rule holding that Miranda
requirements are applicable. It may be the only jurisdiction
19683
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of the admissibility of a confession, a "totality of the circum-
stances" test is appropriate to determine voluntariness of
consent. However, there is added difficulty where the consent
is given after arrest.40 3
The consent of a third person also must be voluntary,
but it is possible to obtain a third person's consent even
though the defendant might have objected.44 Generally a
wife,45 a parent or a girl friend47 may be in a position to
consent; but the basis therefor must be joint control, such
as cotenant or ownership. A landlord has no authority to
consent to a search by others of the tenant's rented premises,
although he may have the right of entry on his own. 48 If a
room or particular property is abandoned, there is no invasion
of privacy occasioned by a search.49
A§2.7 Inspections
There are many governmental inspections affecting in-
dividuals and businesses. Where inspection of individuals,
including area inspections are concerned, it is now clear
that a warrant may be required, with the denial of consent
a prerequisite to obtaining the warrant. This is an entirely
which so holds at this time. State v. Williams, 432 P.2d 679
(Ore. 1967). A more typical case is Weeks v. State, 417 S.W.
2d 716 (Tex. Cr. App. 1967).
43 While consent may be given after arrest, e.g., People v.
Campuzano, 254 A.C.A. 60, - P.2d - , 61 Cal. Rptr. 695
(1967), it is to be viewed with caution. United States v.
Shropshire, 271 F. Supp. 521 (E. D. La. 1967).
.4 Cf. United States v. White, 268 F. Supp. 998 (D.D.C. 1966).
45 The wife's consent has been held valid even where the hus-
band is present but interposed no objection. People v. Bryan,
254 A.C.A. 249, - P.2d -, 62 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1967).
46 State v. Carder, 9 Ohio St.2d 1, 222 N.E.2d 620 (1966).
47 United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1967). Contra,
People v. Rodriguez, 79 Ill. App. 2d 26, 223 N.E.2d 414 (1967)
(no showing of equal right or joint control).
48 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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new concept promulgated in Camara v. Municipal CourtrO;
because of its recent origin no cases construing it are available.
Businesses are also protected by the warrant prerequisite
where fire, health and building code inspections are con-
cerned. 1 Some limitations in these areas are quite possible,
though none have yet been voiced. It is still undetermined
whether there is an implied or future waiver of the warrant
requirement when the inspection is based upon the privilege
granted a licensee, such as tavern, meat market or taxicab
operators.5 2
EFFECTING THE ARREST, SEARcH OR SEIZURE A§3
A§3.1 Entry
To enter lawfully may call for notice. However, "exigent
circumstances" may excuse notice and permit a reasonable
search to proceed. 53
A§3.2 Warrant Essential
A warrant is necessary to make a search which is not
incident to an arrest. However, an arrest warrant still seems
to be superfluous and complicates what might otherwise be
a rather easily applied rule. 4 Even if the arrest warrant is
issued upon an insufficient complaint, the arrest can be legal
49 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Argo v. United
States, 378 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1967).
50 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
r" See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
52 Id.
03 The leading cases are Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958) and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
04 For a more complete discussion, see D. NEDRUi, Warrants
Essential in THE CsnVRmAL LAW A-31 (1967). Although the
Supreme Court seems to give credence to the need for valid
arrest warrants, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480
(1958); the typical answer is given in Lee v. United States,
363 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1966): "Where there is probable
cause for the arrest of a person for a felonious offense, the
19681
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if in fact there was sufficient evidence upon which a warrant
could issue.55 If sufficient grounds exist to arrest prior to
a search, evidence may be legally seized as incident to the
arrest even though the officer had a search warrant based
upon an insufficient affidavit.56
A§3.3 Authority-Resisting Arrest-Force
The authority to arrest may be given by statute or by
the common law. There is nothing from a constitutional stand-
point which would preclude a state officer from arresting
state-wide or a federal officer from arresting nation-wide.
Some officers, such as narcotic agents or border patrolmen,
may have authority to arrest limited to certain crimes only.
Provisions are usually made for "hot pursuit" to enable an
officer to arrest outside his state.57
Authority also exists for a citizens arrest. Except as changed
by statute, the requirement generally is that the citizen know
that a felony was committed and have reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested committed the felony.
Misdemeanor arrests by citizens were nonexistent at com-
mon law, although some authority was granted a citizen to
arrest for a breach of the peace committed in his presence.
absence of a warrant is immaterial, and, the arrest being
valid, the search and seizure that followed was incidential
thereto and valid. The mere fact that the Government might
have had sufficient time to obtain a warrant for his arrest
would not invalidate an otherwise legal arrest with the
ensuing reasonable search and seizure." Bell v. United
States, 371 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1967) (assuming warrant in-
valid). See also People v. Grubb, 250 A.C.A. 820, - P.2d
, 58 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1967).
55 For a thorough discussion, see Ford v. United States, 352
F.2d 927, 933 (D. C. Cir. 1966), with a look to the future in
the concurring opinion of Judge Wright.
56 State v. Allen, 232 A.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1967).
57 UIORmV ARREST ACT. E.g.,ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-4 (b),
(c) (1965).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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Supposedly a person may resist an illegal arrest. To con-
done resistance permits the person sought to be restrained
to judge whether the officer has constitutional and statutory
reasonable grounds. Such a decision is further complicated
by the distinction between felony and misdemeanor arrests.
To alleviate this situation some statutes now make it a crime
to resist either a legal or an illegal arrest.
The force exerted to effect an arrest must be reasonable
as well as befitting of the crime. The use of deadly force
is permitted an officer to subdue a felon. Such a force may
not be applied against a misdemeanant unless the need for
self-defense of the officer is interjected; the regular self-
defense rules then apply.
A§3.4 Execution: Warrant
Generally the warrant for arrest or search must be exe-
cuted and returned in accordance with a statute. The usual
procedure for service is by reading or by handing the warrant
to the person to be arrested or present at the time the search
is to be made.
The return of the warrant by the officer who executed
it may require that he present the person arrested before
the nearest magistrate. The search warrant return requires
an inventory of the things seized.
The search warrant also may be limited as to the time
of its execution, so that a warrant specifying service in the
daytime is void if executed at night. 8
A§3.5 Delay in Arrest or Search
The problem of delay in arrest from the time probable
cause accrues may be analogous to speedy trial problems. In-
volved is possible prejudice to the defense which may result
from inability to obtain witnesses who remember the day or
58 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
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the event or a memory failure on the part of the defendant
himself.59
The delay in arrest or search is frequently occasioned by
the desire to make the most of the arrest or search. The
question in these cases is whether the delay is a pretext to
obtain additional evidence or to search beyond the scope
which would be allowed as incident to the arrest or under
the search warrant.60
SuPPRxssION OF EVIDENCE A§4
A§4.1 Motion-Objection-Hearing-Harmess Error
The federal rules,61 as well as many state rules, require a
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, followed by an
objection at the trial itself. Failure to comply with these
prerequisites constitutes a waiver. There is, however, a pos-
sible exception that waiver cannot be implied when the de-
fendent does not know of his constitutional rights.62
If search is pursuant to a warrant, the burden of showing
that the property seized was obtained illegally may properly
be placed on the defendant.6 If there is no warrant, the bur-
den rests with the state.4 Some states permit the state to
appeal the order granting suppression. 65 If the motion to
suppress is denied, appeal may be taken by the defendant even
after a plea of guilty.66
59 This is established in the District of Columbia by the Ross
doctrine, Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D. C. Cir.
1965). For an analysis, see the case note on Wood v. United
United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D. C. Cir. 1966), in 41 Tum. L.
REv. 926 (1967).
60 Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967).
61 FED. R. Cnm. P. 41 (e).
62 Henry v. Mlississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (assuming that the
failure to object is not a trial tatic).
6 E.g., State v. Elkins, 422 P.2d 250 (Ore. 1966).
" Id.
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ARRESTS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
If the evidence is admitted, its challenge is subject to the
"harmless error rule."6 7
A§4.2 Standing
The fourth amendment protects the individual's right of
privacy. Where the defendant at trial seeks to prevent the
admission of evidence alleged to have been illegally seized,
the question whether his privacy has been invaded may arise.08
If he has a right to be where he is or to have the evidence
where it is, the police action could invade his privacy.69
A§4.3 Disposition: Seized Matter
Contraband, irrespective of the legality of its seizure, need
not be returned and may be destroyed. Stolen merchandise,
even though it is not admissible in evidence, may be returned
to the theft victim.
A§4.4 Derivative Evidence: "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
The exclusionary rule itself is a "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine.70 But, as applied to the seizure of evidence,
the term ordinarily is thought to indicate a step beyond the
actual seizure of the evidence. In other words, if the illegally
seized evidence was the basis for discovery of a witness who
would not otherwise have been found or if it was used in
an interrogation which elicited a confession, the witness or
60 CAL. PENAL CODE § 995. (West, 1956).
601 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-c, (McKinney, 1962 p.p.); see
People v. Rivera, 20 N.Y.2d 669, 282 N.Y.S.2d 279, 229 N.E.2d
59 (N.Y. 1967).
67 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
68 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
0 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States
v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
70 The expression "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first ap-
plied by Mr. Justice Frankfurter to evidence obtained by
eavesdropping. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939).
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the confession may be tainted by the illegally seized evi-
dence.71
A§4.5 Informer Privilege
The informer is recognized by all courts as indispensable
to law enforcement. If the informer's identity is divulged,
his future use is destroyed, and his life may be put in jeo-
pardy.
An informer is protected, but his protection is not un-
limited. Where the informer's information is the basis for
establishing probable cause, it may not be necessary to disclose
his name if his reliability has been previously established. 2
Even if his reliability has not been established, his name still
may not-be revealed if the information has been otherwise
verified or corroborated.73
However, if the informer participated in the transaction
or was an observer, his status is no longer merely that of a
transmitter of information. The defence may then demand
that he be produced as a material witness to prove that the
defendant was in fact not guilty of the alleged crime or to
establish the defense of entrapment.74
71 Wong Stin v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
72 The many informer privilege cases now have been solidified
by McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
73 Id.
74 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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